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Résumé: On développe un modèle multi-agent, extension d'un modèle5 analytique qui étudie la 
structure des coalitions de sites B-to-C, lorsque les consommateurs-internautes ont un coût de 
recherche pour trouver le bien qui correspond à leur préférence, et lorsque les coalitions de 
sites permettent de réduire ces coûts de recherche via des moteurs de recherche spécialisés. Ce 
modèle multi-agent comporte des agents hétérogènes à rationalité limitée: sites et internautes, 
dont on défini l'état et les règles de comportement. Notre objectif est de faire des simulations 
qui mettent en jeu ces deux types d'agents (une populations de sites marchands et une 
population de consommateurs), de les faire interagir à travers une procédure de recherche des 
consommateurs et un processus de formation des coalitions des sites, et d'observer la 
dynamique du système, en particulier en ce qui concerne la structure de coalition émergente. 
Le modèle multi-agent étends ainsi les résultats obtenus dans le modèle analytique, avec des 
hypothèses moins restrictives. En plus du processus de formation des coalitions, le modèle 
théorique se voit aussi enrichi par d'autres règles de comportement pour les sites (entrée sur le 
marché, faillite), ce qui apporte des enseignements sur la dynamique de la concurrence 
lorsque la formation des coalition permet d'accroître la demande au détriment des sites peu ou 
non coalisées. 
 
Abstract: We have developed an agent-based computational model, extension of an analytical model  
that studies the structure of coalitions of B-to-C web sites, when Internet buyers incur search 
costs for finding the good that matches their preferences, and coalitions of sites reduce this 
cost through specialized search engines. This multi-agent model consists of heterogeneous, 
bounded rational agents: sites and web users, which have states and rules of behavior. Our 
goal is to run simulations by instantiating two agent populations (a population of sites/sellers 
and a population of web users/consumers), let the agents interact through the consumer search 
process and the coalition formation process, and monitor the evolution of the simulations in 
order to study the emerging dynamics, in particular the emerging coalition structure. The 
agent-based model extends the analytical results for less restricting assumptions. Moreover, 
beyond the coalition formation process, the analytical model is enriched by additional 
behaviors for the sites (entry and death), which give insights on the dynamics of competition 
when building coalition matters for increasing demand at the expense of non or less coalesced 
sites. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As R. Axtell points out (see [1, 2, 3]), “an agent-based computational model is valuable to study the non-
equilibrium dynamics, in which structure is perpetually born, growing and perishing” , which is the case of the 
constantly evolving Internet Landscape. We develop a agent-based simulation model in order to study the forces 
that drive the Web sites aggregation phenomena, following the principles described in the related litterature (see 
for instance the work of Wooldridge, Jennings, and Kinny [11], [13-15], [24]). We study a virtual environment 
consisting of Internet consumers, online sellers (i.e. B-to-C Web sites competing in a differentiated electronic 
market), and rules of interaction among these economic agents. Placing agents who make individual decisions 
while interacting with other agents in such an environment allows us to study the emergence of coalition 
structures.  
Most of the agent-based approaches that focus on the Internet economy consider that the determinating factor of 
the evolution of the Internet landscape are network effects and increasing returns. For example Lelis et alii 
(2003) explain regularities in the distribution of visitors per Web site using word-of-mouth-based informational 
feedbacks, while taking in account the existence of guiding navigation paths (Web linkages). Lina (2003) 
investigates agglomeration economies, modelizing increasing returns as frequency-dependent choices, while 
allowing Web sites to ameliorate their performance through investment strategies. 
Our approach differs from these contributions in two aspects. Firstly, our analysis does not take into 
consideration such characteristics of the Internet landscape (information feedback effects, sites’ underlying 
network, presence of Web communities and so on). In fact we focus on the aggregation strategy of pure 
merchant sites, trying to capture consumers willing only to buy online. In other words, the Web here is just an 
alternative channel of distribution and not an entertainment good. Secondly, we base our multi-agent 
modelization over a theoretical model that is related to the litterature of Industrial Organization, which allows us 
to take into account economic behaviors (agents are maximizing their utility, taking somehow into account the 
strategic impact of their decisions) rather than pure behavioral rules. 
 
As a basis for the multi-agent model, we first present here a short version of the analytical model that studies the 
phenomenon of coalitions of B-to-C sites available in Laye (2003) and Laye and Tanguy (2004). In this model, 
coalitions are studied within the framework of a circular model of spatial differentiation that represents both the 
characteristics of the differentiated goods offered by Web sites and the tastes of consumers in a given sector. 
These consumers incur a disutility (adaptation cost) when buying a good offered at a distant location, i.e. that 
does not match perfectly with their preferences. As in Gabszewicz and Garela (1986) or Bakos (1997), we 
suppose that sites compete in price facing a population of imperfectly informed consumers. We introduce search 
costs for the consumers in order to find the characteristic of the good offered by a particular site and its price, 
which are independent of their adaptation/transportation. Next, we consider that sites have the possibility of 
forming coalitions and that this leads to a reduction of the search cost for a consumer that visits a site within a 
coalition. The reduction of search costs is considered to be the result of the coordinated efforts of the coalesced 
sites to develop more efficient search tools in order to facilitate the finding of the goods closest to the tastes of 
Internet consumers (mutual electronic linkage among sites or through the development of specialized search 
engines). This leads to an increase in the probability for a coalesced site to be discovered and selected by a 
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consumer. This defines the notion of coalition we are interested in: reduction of search cost rather than price 
coordination or merging. Two main questions motivate this analytical model: absent price coordination, what is 
the economic rationale behind the coalition formation of specialized commercial Web sites and, what is the more 
preferable type of coalition: firms with close products (defined as connex) or highly differentiated ones (non-
connex)?  
 
However, the strength of the assumptions of the analytical model (a market consisting of 4 sites symmetrically 
located with only consecutive natural territories intersecting) requires a more flexible modelling approach, in 
particular because by construction competition between coalitions was not modelized nor the process of coalition 
formation. An agent-based extension of the analytical model of coalition formation mentioned above is designed 
and implemented. In this computational model, agents mimicking the behavior of Web sites and consumers 
interact through two basic processes: the consumers’ search process and the coalition formation process. An 
agent in this model is a logical entity that performs, within the model, a series of actions and is implemented by a 
software entity that has a state and specific behavior rules6.  
Extending the analytical model by introducing dynamics and heterogeneity on the agents’ characteristics and 
behavior enables us to study more systematically the emergent coalition structures in a more complex, and thus 
more realistic, environment. Conclusions based on agent-based simulations can serve as a complement to the 
existing formal theory. Our goal is, first, to verify the robustness of the results of the analytical model when its 
simplifying assumptions are relaxed and, second, have a tool that allows us to execute other scenarios on the 
simulated Web market.  
The developed agent-based model incorporates a dynamic process of coalition formation that is closer to the 
constantly evolving environment of a differentiated Web market where coalitions can be formed in parallel and 
without a bound on their size a priori. Contrary to the analytical model, the number of sites and consumers in the 
simulated market grows over time. Moreover, sites have the ability to dynamically adjust their price using a trial 
and error algorithm based on random experimentation and experience. Furthermore, a process of market entry 
and market exit was added to the agent-based model: sites incur an initial cost to enter the market and unless 
they are able to repay it in a specified amount of time, they are forced to exit the market. Finally, the search cost 
of consumers in the agent-based model lowers with the time they have been on the market under the assumption 
that they get more efficient in using the Web for finding products.  
We are interested in looking at the economical result that is produced from various configurations of the agent-
based model with respect to:  
• The degree of differentiation of the coalesced sites  
• The number and size of the formed coalitions  
• Market shares and profits of sites belonging or not to coalitions 
• The type of sites that manage to survive given the market exit process (coalesced or non-coalesced, and 
if coalesced then connex or non-connex etc.) 
We also intend to study the dependence of the above economic results to the parameters of the model, as well as 
the impact of the model’s assumptions in terms of agents’ heterogeneity and growth rate and the dynamic 
                                                 
6 Our agents belong to the category of “weak agents” according to Wooldridge and Jennings (1995). 
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procedures of coalition formation and price adjustment of the sites. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after a presentation of the modelization of the differentiated 
market, the search procedure of the consumer, and the different coalition structures, we summarize the results of 
the analytical model7 in section 2. The agent-based model is presented in section 3 and the results of the 
simulations are presented in section 4. 
2. Analytical Model of Coalition Formation 
 
As in Bakos (1997) model, we consider a market with a continuum of Internet consumers and m B-to-C sites. m 
is supposed to be common knowledge. Each site j sells a unique good at price pj and the characteristics xj of the 
goods are differentiated along the unit circle8 as in Eaton’s (1976) pioneering work and subsequent models 
(D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, Thisse (1979), Salop (1979), Novshek (1980), Eaton (1982), Stahl (1982), 
Economides (1989)). The tastes xi of the consumers are heterogeneous and uniformly distributed along the same 
circle. By buying a unit of good that does not match exactly with its preference, the consumer incurs an 
adaptation cost t  per unit of distance (t>0) between its location (i.e. its preferred product) and the location on the 
circle of the chosen site i.e. the good offered) for the transaction. Therefore, the utility function if consumer i 
buys a unit offered by site j is: U(i,j)=r-pj-t|xi-xj|, where r is the reservation utility of each consumer. 
 
Consumers’ search procedure. Consumer i acquires information on the location and the price of one of the m 
sites of the electronic market by incurring a constant search cost c>0. We consider this search cost to be both the 
cost associated with the discovery of the site on the Web, for example through a search engine, and the cost of 
visiting the site to find out about its characteristics: sell price S, and distance D. The utility of the consumer in 
case of a transaction is U(S,D)=r-S-tD. If the consumer decides to search further and finds another site located at 
distance x and with price p, the utility in this case is U(p,x)=r-p-tx. Thus, (U(x,p)-U(S,D))+=(S+tD-xt-p)+  
represents the increase of utility for the consumer if U(x,p)-U(S,D)>0 (otherwise it is 0). We suppose that the 
consumers are risk neutral. The calculation of the expected gain in utility based on the priors on the distributions 
of sites’ locations and prices allows the consumer to decide on the opportunity to continue the search procedure. 
This defines the space of strategy of the consumer. 
 
Consumers’ priors. Concerning the priors on prices the consumers believe that at equilibrium all sites choose the 
same price p*. More precisely the distribution of prices is such that  f(p)=1 if p=p*, and f(p)=0 otherwise. 
Concerning the priors on locations, the consumers believe that sites locate according to a uniform distribution 
over the unit circle. We also suppose that consumers find sites according to a random trial with replacement. 
These assumptions are related to the fact that consumers are considered to not change their priors on the 
                                                 
7 This approach shows in particular that it is optimal for a site willing to form a new coalition to choose a site 
whose characteristics are highly differentiated. 
8 We choose a circular differentiation model like in the model of Bakos (1997) rather than the classical linear 
one, first proposed by Hotelling (1929), since, in our model, it is more convenient that all the locations of the 
differentiated market are a priori equivalent. 
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distributions of locations or prices after finding each site. 
 
Stopping rule. The expected gain in utility obtained in this case is:  
∫ ∫
= ℜ
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According to the priors of the consumers on the locations, we find like in Bakos (1997) that g(S,D) = (S+tD-
p*)2/t. Next, the consumer has only to compare its expected gain in utility with the search cost c. If g(S,D)>c, the 
consumer will prefer to continue its search. If g(S,D)<c, the consumer will choose to buy a unit of the good 
located at a distance D and at price S. At equilibrium with rationale expectations for the consumers, S=p*. For 
each consumer i located in xi, we have that g(p*,D)<c on the interval [xi-L, xi+L] , where tcL /= . Consequently, 
if the consumer discovers a site at a distance smaller than L, the transaction will take place. Symmetrically, from 
the point of view of a site, the more distant potential client is located at distance L. We obtain an interval of 
length 2L around any site, which will be referred to as “natural territory”. 
 
Definition 1. The natural territory of a site corresponds to the interval around its location in which consumers 
stop their search and buy from this site if they find it. 
 
Let us now describe the simplest framework needed to capture the effects we want to describe once it is possible 
for sites to coalesce. We consider that m=4, that these sites are located according to the principle of maximum 
differentiation9, and that they sell at price p*, which is also the price anticipated by the consumers. We restrict 
the study in terms of length of natural territories by supposing that LLL ≤<  such that no consumer is priced out 
of the market and the natural territory of a site only intersects with those of its neighbors. In the case of 4 sites, 
we have 8/1=L  and 4/1=L . 
 
Coalition structures. The setting we described is also the minimal setting required to differentiate coalition 
structures: a site willing to coalesce can choose two kind of partners defining the two different categories of 
coalitions. 
 
Definition 3. A coalition will be called “connex” if the natural territories of its members intersect, otherwise the 
coalition will be called “non-connex”. 
                                                 
9 Given the assumptions of our model, we can prove that in a two-stage game in which sites choose locations in 
the first stage of the game and set prices in the second stage, sites choose the same price (symmetric equilibrium) 
and locate so as to maximize the distance between their locations. 
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For LLL ≤< , a coalition is connex if its members are located consecutively on the circle (little differentiation), 
and non-connex otherwise (high differentiation). 
From the point of view of the consumers, visiting a coalesced site allows the consumer, which has only incurred 
the search cost c for a search on the entire Web, to visit other sites by incurring a lower cost c’<c within the 
coalition. We normalize c’ to zero. We suppose that the consumer benefits only ex post from the reduction of the 
search cost: the consumer do not anticipate the presence of a coalition on the market and if one coalition is 
discovered the search procedure continues without modifying its priors accordingly. Modifying the priors would 
be equivalent to consider that after discovering a coalition (without finding a site to make the transaction), the 
search cost is lower for the rest of the search procedure. In other words, the expected gain is increased since 
there is more chance to find a site that matches the preferences of the consumer from now on, in a market with 
coalitions. Therefore after the first discovering of a coalition and for the rest of the search procedure we would 
be in an equivalent situation than without this simplifying assumption. Therefore the results are not affected 
qualitatively by this assumption. From the point of view of a coalesced site, a coalition is a possibility to increase 
its expected demand.  
 
2.1 Results of the analytical model10 
 
The static comparative of the two coalition structures, putting aside price competition shows that with fixed 
prices, a site willing to coalesce has more incentives to choose a non-connex partner. 
Concerning the way in which strategic pricing for the sites influences the choice of the coalition structure, it is 
shown that for both coalition structures (connex and non-connex), coalesced sites have an incentive to lower 
their prices from the one obtained without coalitions in order to increase their natural. The opposite tendency is 
observed for the non-coalesced sites: they increase their price in order to decrease the length of this territory. 
Furthermore, the non-connex coalition is more aggressive than the connex one. The fact that non-connex 
partners decrease more their prices than is they were in a connex coalition shows that it is not the increase in the 
competition between the coalesced sites that drives the price decrease. Decreasing the price reflects only the 
opportunity to gain market share from the non-coalesced sites. When the coalition is connex, a coalesced site 
gains market shares from the territory shared with a non-coalesced site (on one side of its location) and shares 
equally the rest of the consumers with its partner (on the other side of its location), which brings no additional 
demand. The gain of market shares is far better exploited when the coalition is non-connex since it occurs on 
both sides of coalesced sites’ locations, without interacting with their partner. 
Finally, by comparing the profit of the coalesced sites depending on the coalition structure, with price 
competition, the result we obtain with fixed prices still holds: the non-connex structure is always preferred by the 
initiator of a new coalition. 
Given that the existence of search costs that are independent from the adaptation costs is a specific characteristic 
of Internet distribution, the analysis carried out above can enlighten the discussions on the emerging structures of 
B-to-C coalitions, as part of the evolving Internet landscape. However, we are interested in the way the 
heterogeneity of sites and consumers and the dynamics of the coalition formation can influence the mechanisms 
captured by the analytical model, which is a motivation for the agent-based model presented in the next sections. 
                                                 
10 These results are available in Laye(2003) and Laye, Tanguy (2004) 
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3. Agent-based Model 
 
We have developed an agent-based computational model, extension of the analytical model described earlier. 
This model consists of heterogeneous, bounded rational agents: sites and Web users, which have states and rules 
of behavior. Our goal is to run simulations by instantiating two agent populations: a population of sites/sellers 
and a population of Web users/consumers, let the agents interact through the consumer search process and the 
coalition formation process, and monitor the evolution of the simulations in order to study the emerging 
dynamics. 
 
3.1 The rational behind 
 
Our major motivation in developing an agent-based computational model comes from the fact that agents with 
diverse and heterogeneous characteristics and behaviors will facilitate the systematic study and advance our 
understanding of the emergent coalition structures in the Web as a complement to the formal theory. We are 
interested in seeing the economical result that can come out from various configurations of the model with 
respect to:  
• the degree of differentiation of the coalesced sites (connexity) 
• the number and size of the formed coalitions  
• market share and profits of sites inside and outside of coalitions 
 
We intend to study the dependence of the above economic results to the parameters of the model, as well as the 
impact of the model’s assumptions in terms of heterogeneity of the agents, rationality and search process of the 
consumers and the coalition formation process of the sites. 
 
3.2 Set-up of the model 
 
Assumption 1: Initial Conditions 
 
Sites select their locations on the market. In the model two alternative selection schemes are considered. In the 
first, each site j selects its location yj randomly from a uniform distribution (yj~U[0,1] , ∀j =1..M0, where M0 is 
the initial number of sites in the market), while in the second sites are positioned in the market according to the 
principle of maximal differentiation (yj=j/M0, ∀j=1.. M0). We also assume that there are two alternative schemes 
for the setting of prices. Sites can either select the price of their product randomly from a uniform distribution 
between pmin and pmax (pj~U[pmin, pmax], ∀j=1.. M0) or all sites set their price to a constant price p*. Furthermore, 
consumers anticipate that the prices set by sites are uniformly distributed between pAmin and pAmax. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the circle. Consumer i’s location is denoted by xi, ∀ i=1..N0, where 
N0 is the initial number of consumers in the market. Consumer i’s reservation utility Ri is selected randomly from 
a uniform distribution between Rmin and Rmax,∀i=1.. N0. The adaptation cost ti (utility loss per distance unit 
between consumer i’s location and the site’s location) is also selected randomly between tmin and tmax, for each 
consumer. Each consumer i has associated with him a search cost ci for discovering a new site, selected 
randomly between cmin and cmax. Moreover, consumer i will have a reduced search cost ci’, when discovering sites 
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within a coalition, selected randomly from a uniform distribution between 0 and ci (ci’~U[0, ci] , ∀i=1.. N0). 
 
Assumption 2: Market Entry and Exit 
 
We assume that each site incurs an initial cost in order to enter the market. This cost, denoted by Centry, 
represents an initial capital borrowed from a bank for the set up of the site (network equipment, hardware and 
software, advertisement expenses, etc.). The goal of each site is to repay this initial dept and be able to be 
profitable within a specified amount of time denoted by TB. More precisely, in each step a site has to be able to 
repay the interest over the current dept from the profit made in this step. The current dept is reduced by the 
difference of its profit and the interest it had to pay. If after a period of TB steps since it entered the market, the 
site is not able to fully repay its current dept to the bank, the site is forced to exit the market. This defines the 
dying process of the sites. If a site that belongs to a coalition11 dies the coalition’s size is reduced by one. 
 
Assumption 3: Agents’ growth rates and localisation  
 
We assume that the number of consumers and the number of sites grow exponentially with time at rates gc and gs 
respectively. Therefore at time step t the number of consumers M(t) and sites N(t) are given by the following 
formulas: 
 
New consumers and sites are initialised in the same way as the initial populations (see 3.2.1). The locations of 
the new sites that are added approximate the principle of maximal differentiation in the following way: the first 
site that is added is located equidistantly between a pair of existing sites randomly selected, the second site to be 
added in the market is located diametrically opposite to the previous site, the third site is located also in the 
middle of another pair of sites randomly selected and so on, such as shown in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Concerning the locations of the users as their population grow over time, we assume that each time new users are 
added to the market, the locations of all users (the new ones included) are rearranged so that they follow the 
principal of maximal differentiation. This assumption is related to the fact that consumers have no “identity” in 
this model, since their influence lies in the level of aggregate demand. On the contrary, sites cannot change 
                                                 
11 See Section 3.2.6 for an explanation of the coalition formation process. 
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location (characteristic of the good) with the entry of each new site. 
 
Assumption 4: Coalition Formation Process 
 
Every Tc time steps a fractionα  of the single sites and a fraction β of coalesced sites is randomly activated to 
engage in a new coalition formation process. Depending on whether the activated site is single or coalesced, one 
of the following will occur: 
• If the site is single, then it becomes a coalition initiator by selecting a partner randomly from all the 
sites in the market. If the selected partner is single as well, they form a new coalition of size 2. 
Otherwise, the selected coalesced site “proposes” to the single site to join this coalition, thereby 
increasing the size of the existing coalition by one.  
• If the site already belongs to some coalition, then it randomly selects a single partner in order to expand 
its coalition by one member. In our model, we do not allow the merging of two existing coalitions into a 
new one. 
Once a new coalition is formed, in one of the ways mentioned above, it is tested on the market for the next Tc 
time steps. At the end of the test period, each member of the new coalition compares the sum of its individual 
profits over the last Tc time steps with the equivalent sum in the previous Tc time steps (whether they belonged 
to a coalition or not). If profits have increased for each site of the new coalition then we consider that the 
criterion of individual satisfaction is satisfied (the coalition is considered profitable for all participants) and the 
coalition is permanently adopted (the last site to enter is definitively accepted as a member). Otherwise, the last 
member added in the coalition is not accepted. Sites that have been rejected by a given coalition, will not be 
candidates for acceptance by the same coalition ever again in the course of the simulation. 
 
Remark: In our simulations we have included the possibility that there is only one site that acts as initiator and 
selects other sites to participate in its coalition. In this way, instead of having many coalitions growing in 
parallel, we obtain a single coalition growing which has the advantage of being more simple to study and, 
afterwards, we can compare the results obtained when there is only one coalition with those obtained when we 
allow multiple coalition formation. 
 
Assumption 5: Consumers’ Search Process 
 
In each time step a fraction γ  of consumers is randomly activated to undertake a new search process that may 
result in the purchase of one product unit. Each consumer starts its search process by randomly selecting a site to 
visit from the whole population of sites. During the visit, the consumer observes the site’s product offering and 
price (price S, distance D between the consumer’s location and the product’s characteristic ) by incurring a 
constant search cost ci. The consumer computes the utility U(S,D) it will derive if it buys from this particular site 
and the expected gain in utility g(S,D) from continuing its search process by selecting another site to visit. The 
comparison of g(S,D) with the search cost defines the opportunity of continuing the search process as follows:  
• If the current site does not belong to any coalition, the consumer’s search cost is ci. If g(S,D) is less than 
ci the consumer stops its search process and buys from the current site, else the consumer continues the 
search process by selecting randomly another site.  
• If, however, the current site belongs to some coalition then the consumer can discover at a search cost 
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ci’, lower than ci, the offerings of the rest of the members of the coalition. In this case, the consumer 
compares g(S,D) to ci’ and if the computed expected gain is larger, then the consumer continues the 
search process by randomly selecting another member of the current coalition. If the coalition has no 
members left to visit the consumers selects randomly from the rest of the population of sites.  
Consequently, the search process stops in two ways:  
(i) the expected gain in utility from continuing the search is less than the search cost in which case the consumer 
buys from the current site  
(ii) the consumer has visited every site on the market but the expected gain in utility is still higher than the search 
cost. In this case, the consumer cannot continue its search process but does not perform a transaction at any site: 
consumer is “priced out”. 
 
Assumption 6: Sites’ Price Adjustment Procedure 
 
Sites periodically adjust their prices according to the following procedure: Each TP time steps, where TP is a 
model parameter, each site readjusts its price after comparing the sum of profits that it had during the last TP 
steps with the one of the previous TP steps. If there has been an increase in profits, the site makes a price 
adjustment selected randomly in ±[δpmin, δpmax], otherwise the site readopts the price it had before the last price 
adjustment. In the rest of this document we will refer to this algorithm as RND.   
We also study the results of the Derivative Following Algorithm (see Kephart et alii (1998)) for the price 
adjustment process. According to this algorithm, each site makes its first price adjustment randomly (±U[δpmin, 
δpmax]). If (after TP steps), the sites finds that its profits have increased, it keeps moving the price in the same 
direction; otherwise it reverses direction. In the rest of this document we will refer to this algorithm as DFA.   
 
For example, the following figure shows the effect of the RND adjustment algorithm in an experiment with 4 
sites that started from random prices, when no coalitions are formed. We can observe that gradually the price of 
the sites gets closer to the theoretical equilibrium price, which for that experiment was 1000. This price 
adjustment algorithm will be also used in experiments where coalition formation is allowed. 
 
Figure 9 
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Assumption 7: Consumers’ expertise and reduction of search cost  
 
In order to take into consideration the fact that consumers improve with time their ability to search and find 
products on the Web, we consider that the search cost of the consumers decreases linearly with time according to 
two alternative ways:  
(i) each consumer i has an initial search cost of ci0 when it enters the market and this search cost 
decreases linearly with its age reaching the value of ciend at the end of the simulation. This assumption 
reflects the fact that each consumer gets more familiar with the Web with time thereby improving its 
ability to search and locate products. 
(ii) all consumers have the same search cost at each time step of the simulation. The consumers’ search 
costs starts from ci0 at time step 0 and decreases linearly with time reaching the value of ciend at the end 
of the simulation. This assumption reflects the fact that the population of Internet users as a whole 
improves its searching abilities with time, since a new user that is interested in consuming products 
can profit from the accumulated experience of previous users. 
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 Table of model parameters 
 
N Final number of sites 
M Final number of consumers 
Activation 
α  Fraction of the single sites’ population activated for coalition formation every K time steps  
β  Fraction of the coalesced sites’ population activated for coalition formation every K time steps  
γ  Fraction of the consumers’ population activated in each time step 
Agents’ Growth  
M0 Initial number of consumers 
N0 Initial number of sites 
gs Sites’ growth rate 
gc Consumers’ growth rate 
Search process 
cmin Lower bound for consumers’ search cost 
cmax Upper bound for consumers’ search cost 
c’ Reduced search cost 
Rmin Lower bound for consumers’ reservation utility 
Rmax Upper bound for consumers’ reservation utility 
Tmin Lower bound for consumers’ adaptation cost 
Tmax Upper bound for consumers’ adaptation cost 
Coalition formation process 
TC Number of time steps between site’s activation for coalition testing and formation 
Prices 
pmin Lower bound for sites’ price 
pmax Upper bound for sites’ price 
pAmin Lower bound for consumers’ anticipated price 
pAmax Upper bound for consumers’ anticipated price 
TP Number of time steps between site’s activation for price adjustment 
minδ  Lower bound for sites’ price adjustment 
maxδ  Upper bound for sites’ price adjustment 
Market entry/exit 
Centry Sites’ market entry cost 
i Interest rate for sites 
TB Number of time steps in which each site has to repay his initial dept 
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4. Simulation Results 
 
4.1 Simulation plan  
 
The analytical result presented earlier, serves as the starting point for a series of experiments with the agent-
based model whose results will be the subject of the rest of this document. One of our primary goals is to verify 
the robustness of the analytical result in the agent-based environment that has been built. The first step of the 
simulation plan consists of keeping the symmetry assumptions that have been used in the analytical model in 
order to study the impact of the coalition formation procedure on the market structure (first when there is only 
one coalition growing and then when there are multiple coalitions growing in parallel). In this context, we 
analyse the role of the structural parameters of the model (i.e. adaptation cost and search cost) on the results. The 
next steps of the simulation plan consist of exploring the effect of the market entry and exit processes on the 
market structure, as well as the effect of the decrease of the consumers’ search cost and the sites’ price 
adjustment procedure. More precisely, we are interested in identifying those forces that are capable of creating 
aggregation in our simulated market. Aggregation, here, is defined as the existence of a small number of big 
coalitions and a large number of single sites or sites participating in very small coalitions. Finally, we introduce 
heterogeneity in the simulations and the ability for the sites to adjust their prices. 
The simulation plan described above provides an overview of the elementary economic mechanisms that drive 
the emerging structure of the coalitions by analyzing the combined effects of the structural parameters, the 
different coalition formation procedures, the processes of market entry and exit and the price adjustment 
mechanism.  
 
4.2 Reference Simulation 
 
To study the impact of the structural parameters on the results of the model in terms of emerging coalition 
structure we start by a simple case: 
• Consumers are identical (same search cost, adaptation cost and reservation utility, symmetric locations)  
• Sites are symmetric (same price, symmetric locations)  
• Inside a coalition the search cost of the consumers is c’=0 
Given these assumptions, we test two different coalition formation procedures: 
(i) A unique site is activated as initiator of a single coalition that grows throughout the simulation 
(ii) All sites can be activated and are able to form coalitions in parallel throughout the simulation 
The results in terms of size obtained with the first coalition formation procedure can be used as a reference for 
those obtained with the second. 
In the scenarios presented here, all sites are located according to the principal of maximum differentiation 
whereas the consumers expect the distribution of sites’ locations to be uniform. All sites set the same price p*, 
which is the price anticipated by consumers (pAmin=pAmax=p*) .  
 
 
In this section we study the size and the number of coalitions formed and how these are affected by the structural 
parameters of the model that define the configuration of the configuration of natural territories in the market. We 
4.2.1 Size and number of coalitions 
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also study the effect of two different criteria that sites can use for accepting a coalition. Finally, we analyze the 
emerging coalition structures which, like in the theoretical model, are most of the times non-connex and, in 
addition to this, we explain the presence of connex components in the coalitions formed. 
 
4.2.1.1 Only consecutive natural territories intersect  
 
To begin with, we present the results of an experiment that is the generalisation of the 4 sites case of the 
analytical model to 20 sites and where only the natural territories of consecutive sites intersect. The characteristic 
of this setting is that the notion of connexity corresponds to consecutive locations on the circle.  
There are 1000 consumers in the market. Consumers have a reservation utility of 10000 and an adaptation cost 
per unit of distance equal to 1000, meaning that they will pay at most 500 units to adapt for the version that is 
more far away from their ideal one (when distance=1/2). Furthermore, consumers incur a fixed search cost of 1 
unit. All sites offer their products at the same price equal to 10 and consumers anticipate this price.  
The following table contains the values of the most important simulation parameters for this run.  
 
Parameter Value 
Number of sites 20 
Number of users 1000 
Reservation Utility  10000 
Search Cost 1  
Reduced Search Cost 0 
Adaptation Cost 1000 
Consumers’ anticipated price p*= 10 
Consumers’ priors on locations Uniform 
Distribution of prices pmin=pmax= 10 
 
Remark: The length of the sites’ natural territory in this case is 063.0/2 =tc . 
 
We examine the case of sites using the individual satisfaction criterion in order to decide whether to coalesce or 
not. We compare the results obtained with two different coalition formation processes: (i) when a single coalition 
is growing and (ii) when multiple coalitions are growing in parallel.  
(i) Figure 10a shows a typical run of simulation where only one coalition is allowed to grow (there is only one 
initiator site) and sites are tested for participation in this coalition. In this simulation, the single coalition 
formation lead to a coalition of size 5.  
 
Figure 10a 
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(ii) Figure 10b shows a typical result of a simulation using the same parameters but allowing, this time, the 
formation of multiple coalitions with different initiators. The simulation ended when there was no way for the 
existing coalitions to grow more. For presentation reasons, instead of drawing all the coalitions on the same 
circle, coalitions are grouped by size. In the table below the circles, the number and the size of the formed 
coalitions are mentioned. 
Figure 10b 
In this simulation, the multiple coalition formation lead to the emergence of 5 coalition (1 of size 2, 1 of size 3, 1 
of size 4 and 2 of size 5). 
As we can see from Figure 10a, the single coalition grew by adding a non-connex member each time. The only 
way in this case to obtain a “connex component” (two members of the coalition are connex) is that the coalition 
starts (from single to size 2) by this connex coalition. Furthermore, Figure 10b shows a big majority of non-
connex components in the case of multiple coalition formation.  
 
1st outcome of the agent-based approach: The dynamic process coalition formation confirms and 
generalises the theoretical result in terms of coalition structure: non-connex partners are preferred when 
forming a coalition12. 
 
In addition to this, in Figure 10a the size of the coalition obtained is 5, which is much smaller than what could be 
expected (a single coalition of size 10, see Figure 11). In fact, by extending the result of the theoretical model 
(non-connex partners are preferable to connex ones), we would expect in the case of a single coalition growing 
in a market with 20 sites to obtain a non-connex coalition of size 10.  
 
Figure 11 
This can be attributed to the fact that the number of consumers inside the natural territory of any site is very 
                                                 
12 This phenomenon is systematically observed in all the different simulation scenarios described in the rest of 
the document. 
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small, only 1000*0.063 = 63 consumers. As a result, the intersection of natural territories contains 1000*0.013 = 
13 consumers. Without coalitions, consecutive sites would share equally these 13 consumers. As explained in the 
analysis of theoretical model, a coalition of size 2 with a non-connex site increases the probability to obtain these 
consumers from 1/2 to 2/3. This amounts to 8 consumers on expectation instead of 6. However, for larger 
coalitions, for example when the coalition passes from size 5 to 6, the expected amount of consumers is now 
(6/7-5/6)*13 = 1.53. In other words, due to the combined effect of the number of consumers on the market 
(discrete distribution, instead of continuous distribution as in the theoretical model) and the length of natural 
territories, the advantage of being coalesced may not appear.  
Added to this random effect, the marginal increase in profits to the last entrant in a coalition decreases with the 
size of the coalition. Figure 12 shows the average profit increase for the members of the single coalition of 
Figure 10a in function of the size of the coalition during the simulation. The average profit increased by 23,7% 
when the initiator found another single site to coalesce with, but as new sites were being added to the coalition 
the average profit increase became less and less, e.g. the addition of the last member of the coalition brought an 
average profit increase of 4,3%.  
Figure 12 
 
In the case of multiple coalition formation (Figure 10b), for the reasons described above, the maximum coalition 
size obtained was also 5. For the case of multiple coalition formation in particular, another phenomenon can 
have impact on the stopping of the growth of a coalition: the “competition” among existing coalitions for new, 
highly differentiated members. The more the different coalitions grow in size, the fewer the remaining highly 
differentiated sites that could be accepted by these coalitions.  
 
2nd outcome of the agent-based approach: The growth of the coalition is halted before it reaches the size 
of the maximum possible non-connex coalition. 
 
The importance of this result lies in the fact that a discrete distribution of consumer preferences is a more 
realistic setting than the continuum considered in the theoretical model. The outcome of the theoretical model 
according to which it is always profitable to coalesce has to be reconsidered since the way in which the number 
of consumers interacts with the values of the search cost and adaptation cost (that define the length of the natural 
territories) influences dramatically the size of the coalitions.  
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4.2.1.2 Impact of the model’s structural parameters 
 
In the previous section the extreme case of natural territories intersecting only for consecutive neighbors. In this 
section, we present the typical results from an experiment in which the values of the parameters concerning the 
adaptation cost of the consumers are such that the natural territory of each site is so large that it almost covers the 
whole circle. More precisely, in this experiment the intersection of the natural territories concerns not only 
consecutive sites: each site is little differentiated with the 8 sites that are consecutively located before and after 
this site on the circle.  
In fact, the analysis of the impact of the parameters of the model reveals that only the values of search cost and 
adaptation cost have a dramatic impact on the emerging coalition structures in the market since they define the 
configuration of sites in terms of natural territories (every pair (c,t) interacting with the priors of consumers and 
the number of sites defines the way the natural territories of sites intersect).  
The following table contains the values of the most important simulation parameters for this run.  
 
Parameter Value 
Number of sites 20 
Number of users 1000 
Reservation Utility  100 
Search Cost 1  
Reduced Search Cost 0 
Adaptation Cost 5 
Consumers’ anticipated price p*= 10 
Consumers’ priors on locations uniform 
Distribution of prices pmin=pmax= 10 
 
Remark: The length of the sites’ natural territory in this case is =tc/2 0.89. This means that in this particular 
experiment almost only sites whose locations are diametrically opposed on the circle are non-connex, while in 
the theoretical model and in the previous experiment there was a equivalence between being connex and being 
neighbor for a site. 
Figure 13a shows the coalitions obtained. when a single is growing. In this simulation, the process stopped at 
size 2. 
 
Figure 13a 
 
In Figure 13b we also see that only coalitions of small size emerged, consisting of 2-3 members (5 coalitions of 
size 2 and 3 coalitions of size 3). 
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Figure 13b 
Given that there is extended overlapping among the natural territories in this experiment, one would expect that 
there would be no coalitions of size greater than 2 in the case of multiple coalitions, just like in the case of a 
single coalition growing, since only diametrically opposed sites have territories that do not intersect. 
 
Existence of connex components 
 
In the case of multiple coalition formation, we observe that connex partners are accepted in coalitions. To 
explain this phenomenon we analyze the history of the formation of the coalition (3,13,8) of Figure 14b.  
 
Chronologically, sites 3 and 13, which are non-connex sites, formed a coalition of size 2. This allows site 3, for 
example, to attract more consumers on expectation over those that belong to the intersection of territories with 
connex sites that are not yet coalesced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Next, coalitions (2,16) and (5,18) are formed during the dynamic process of multiple coalition formation. So, 
site 3 is now surrounded by two connex neighbors that participate in coalitions of size 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the advantage of being coalesced for site 3 is diminished: the probability to obtain consumers 
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belonging to the intersections of natural territories of sites 2, 3 and 5 is now identical for these three sites. 
 
Afterwards, site 8 enters coalition (3,13). Thus, we obtain a coalition of size 3 (3, 13, 8) with 2 connex 
components (13,8) and (3,8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This phenomenon, which is impossible in the case of one coalition that grows (see Figure 14a), is made possible 
due to the dynamic process of multiple coalition formation. Even though this site is connex with site 3, the 
participation of site 8 in the coalition is beneficial for site 3 which can now attract more consumers than sites 2 
and 5. For similar reasons site 13 accepts the entry of site 8 in the coalition since it is surrounded by coalitions 
(10,12) and (1,14) that are not drawn for presentation reasons (see Figure 14b).  
 
3rd outcome of the agent-based approach: Although non-connex partners are always preferable for 
coalescing with, the dynamic process of multiple coalition formation allows the emergence of coalitions 
containing connex components as a reply to the competition from existing coalitions in the market. 
 
4.3 Adding agents’ growth and market exit 
 
In this section we study scenarios in which we keep the assumptions of symmetry but the population of users and 
sites grow over time with exponential rate (Assumption 3). Furthermore, sites have a procedure for market exit 
in order to study in a more realistic context the resulting market structure (Assumption 2).  
 
The sequence of events in the simulations presented in the rest of this document is shown in Figure 16. One can 
observe that the events of coalition formation and of market entry/exit are separated in time in order to avoid the 
“noise” that will be produced by the combined effect of these events. In this way, when a coalition is tested in 
the market, the structure of the market does not change (no competitors enter or die and the number of 
consumers does not change) and, as a result, the members of the coalition decide based on the pure effect of the 
coalition.  
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Figure 14 
 
The following table contains the values of the most important simulation parameters for the experiments 
presented in this section. The values of the consumers’ adaptation and search cost are such that the natural 
territories of each pair of consecutive sites that belong to the initial population of sites intersect. Concerning the 
locations of the new sites and users they follow the principal of maximal differentiation as described in 
Assumption 3. 
Parameter Value 
Number of sites 100 
Number of users 5000 
Initial number of sites 20 
Initial number of users 1000 
Reservation Utility  10000 
Search Cost 1  
Reduced Search Cost 0 
Adaptation Cost 1000 
Consumers’ anticipated price p*= 10 
Consumers’ priors on locations uniform 
Distribution of prices pmin=pmax= 10 
 
In order to have a reference for our experiments when new sites and users enter the market and sites exit the 
market, we present firstly the results of an experiment where there is no dying process and the numbers of sites 
and users grow at exponential rate. Next, we show the results when sites incur an initial cost to enter the market 
and die if they cannot repay it in a predefined time. Finally, we explore the effect of different combinations of 
the growth rates of sites and users on these results. 
 
 
In this section, we study the results obtained when the number of users and sites grows exponentially with time 
in such a way that the ratio of users to sites is constant in each time step of the simulation. 
 
The following table shows the number of coalesced and non-coalesced sites in the end of the simulation. We see 
that the majority of sites (79%) participate in some coalition. Most of the sites that did not coalesce are sites that 
entered the market towards the end of the simulation (they did not have time to test their participation in enough 
coalitions to find a profitable one). In addition to this, sites that enter late during the simulation are 
systematically connex with existing sites (since the location of a new site is always between the locations of two 
consecutive sites on the circle), which makes them less attractive for adherence in the existing coalitions. 
 
Figure 15 shows the average profit of the coalesced sites, the average profit of the non-coalesced sites and the 
average profit over all sites in each simulation time step.  
4.3.1. Agent growth without market exit 
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Figure 15 
 
When a category of sites (coalesced or non-coalesced) is absent from the market in some step of the simulation, 
the average profit of this category is zero. It is evident in Figure 17 that the average profit of non-coalesced sites 
is almost always lower than that of the coalesced sites throughout the simulation. In the rare occasion in which 
the average profit of non-coalesced sites surpasses that of coalesced sites (time steps 65, 68, 87 and 88), it 
happened that there is only 1 non-coalesced site in the market and its profit was higher that the average profit of 
all the coalesced sites. The dynamic process does not alter the result obtained in Proposition 8 of the theoretical 
model: the average profit of coalesced sites is better than the profit of non-coalesced sites. 
The average profit over all sites (coalesced and non coalesced) is constant since the ratio of consumers to sites is 
constant during the whole simulation and that no consumer is priced-out (since there is no dying process and the 
territories of the initial population of sites intersect). 
 
The following figure shows the number of coalitions that exist in the market in each time step of the simulation.  
Figure 16 
 
In time step 1 when there were 20 sites in the market, 10 coalitions were formed. The number of coalitions 
remained 10 until time step 155. This shows that most of the new sites that entered in the market participate in 
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one of the initial coalitions, while the rest of the new entrants remained single. The explanation of this 
phenomenon is related to the activation for coalition formation and the exponential growth rate of sites: 
• When a site belonging to 1 of these 10 coalitions is activated it will chose a single site to coalesce with, 
and since sites enter 1 or 2 at a time (at big intervals in the beginning due to the exponential rate) the 
probability for new sites to be integrated in the existing coalitions is very high.  
• When a new site is activated it has more chances to choose to coalesce with a site that already belongs 
to some coalition than with another single site.  
After time step 155, new entrants to be rejected by the existing coalitions that have, by that time, reached their 
maximum size. This creates the possibility for these rejected sites to choose or be chosen by new entrants and 
form new coalitions. 
 
In this experiment 16 coalitions of different sizes ranging from 2 to 7 were formed. Coalitions of final size from 
5 to 7 were formed in the beginning of the simulation, whereas the majority of smaller size coalitions were 
formed in relatively late stages of the run (after time step 155 as mentioned above). 
 
Coalition size 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of coalitions 1 2 2 4 6 1 
 
Figure 17 shows the coalitions that emerged in this experiment grouped by size on the same circle. 
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Figure 17 
The first interesting phenomenon is that coalitions often surpass in size the maximum size found in the 
experiment where there was not growth in the agent populations. This can be attributed to the fact both to the 
growth of the number of sites and the growth of consumers: 
• The growth of consumers reduces the “random effect”, described in the 1rst outcome of our approach, 
thus allowing a coalition to grow more towards the size of the maximum non-connex coalition (size 10). 
• The growth of sites changes the structure of the market in terms natural territories, making that more 
sites are connex. Therefore, as explained in the 3rd outcome of our approach connex components are 
now likely to appear increasing the size of a coalition.  
 
4th outcome of the agent-based approach: The agents’ growth allows the coalitions to grow more 
through the reduction of the random effect (consumers’ growth) and the possibility to accept connex components 
(sites’ growth). 
 
 
 
In the following sections we study the results obtained when the number of users and sites grows exponentially 
with time and when there is the process so that sites exit the market described in Assumption 2. The related 
parameters are the following: 
 
 
 
In this setting we will study the effect of different combinations of consumers-users ratio:  
• Constant ratio of consumers to sites over time: the ratio of consumers to sites is constant during the 
simulation 
• Increasing ratio of consumers to sites over time: the ratio of consumers to sites increases during the 
simulation 
• Decreasing ratio of consumers to sites over time the ratio of consumers to sites decreases during the 
simulation 
 
4.3.2.1 Constant ratio of consumers to sites over time 
 
First we examine the case in which sites and users enter the market with exponential growth rates but in such a 
4.3.2 Agent growth with market exit 
Entry Cost 3600 
Time to repay 8 time steps 
Interest rate 5% 
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way that the ratio of users to sites is constant and equal to 50 in each time step of the simulation. 
 
The following table contains aggregate statistics concerning the number of alive and dead sites and whether they 
are coalesced or not in the end of the simulation. We see that almost half of the sites (52%) do not manage to 
repay their initial dept and exit the market. Furthermore, most of the sites that survived belong to some coalition, 
38 of them are coalesced in the end of the simulation and only 10 of them are not coalesced. This is due to the 
fact that, on one hand, it is better for a site to belong to a coalition than being single and, on the other hand, the 
entry and exit of sites in the market creates constantly new opportunities for sites to coalesce. 
 
Number of 
alive coalesced sites 
Number of 
alive non coalesced sites
Number of 
dead coalesced sites
Number of 
dead non coalesced sites 
38 (38%) 10 (10%) 40 (40%) 12 (12%) 
 
The following figure shows the average profit of the coalesced sites and non-coalesced sites, as well as the 
average profit over all sites in each simulation time step.  
Figure 18 
 
As when there is no market exit, we see that the average profit of coalesced sites is higher than the average profit 
of the non-coalesced sites. The average profit over all sites and over the coalesced sites increases with time, 
since the death of some sites increases the demand of the remaining sites (for what concerns non priced-out 
consumers). More precisely, the average profit of coalesced sites is 2,3 times higher than that of the previous 
experiment, while the average profit of the non-coalesced sites is 1,7 times higher than before. 
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The two lines in the next figure represent the number of alive and dead sites in each step of the simulation. The 
thicker line represents the number of alive sites.  
Figure 19 
 
The population of sites starts by 20 and throughout the simulation new sites enter the market while others exit 
the market. In time step 9, which is the time step in which each site of the initial population of sites has to fully 
repay its entry dept, 13 out of the 20 initial sites exit the market. We present here this experiment because neither 
all the sites of the initial population exit from the market, nor all of them survive. When all the initial sites exit 
the market, the simulation describes a situation in which sites enter progressively increasing the size of a single 
coalition without any competition. In this case a single, big coalition is obtained in a trivial way. When no sites 
exit the market, the influence of the dying process is invisible. The choice of parameters of the less violent 
intermediary case is therefore more interesting.  
 
The number of existing coalitions in each time step is shown in the Figure 20.  
Figure 20 
 
In the beginning of the simulation (time step 1) 10 coalitions are formed among the 20 sites of the initial 
population. However, this number is reduced to 2 at time step 9 as some coalition members failed to repay their 
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dept and exited the market. We see that 8 coalitions are finally in the market, while in the previous experiment, 
with no market exit, the final number of coalitions was considerably higher (18). For the same reasons, the 
number of coalitions remains 3 for a large period of time steps, meaning that the new entrants are integrated to 
the existing coalitions rather than forming new ones.  
 
Figure 21 shows the average profit (i.e. the sum of profits of the members of coalition divided by the coalition 
size) in function of the coalition size.  
Figure 21 
 
The 8 coalitions that formed in this experiment had sizes from 2-8 as we can see in the following table. 
 
Coalition Size  
2 3 4 5 6 8 
Number of coalitions 1 1 1 2 2 1 
 
From the output of this run we can observe the coexistence of a relatively high number of relatively large size 
coalitions (5 coalitions of size more than 5).  
 
Definition 3. We define a notion of aggregation related to the proportion of coalitions of each size:  
• A market structure in which we observe the emergence of a high number of big coalitions coexisting is 
considered to be dispersed resulting in an oligopolistic market. 
• A market structure in which there is only a small number of big coalitions while the rest of the sites are 
either single or participate in small coalitions is considered to be concentrated. In this case, the market 
structure goes towards duopoly or monopoly structures.  
 
As a result of this experiment we observe the emergence of an oligopolistic market structure.  
In a larger scale experiment where the number of sites that enter the market goes to 1000 and the number of 
consumers to 50000, we obtained the same phenomenon of dispersion in the market. Out of 86 coalitions 33 
have size larger than 5:  
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Coalition Size 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of coalitions 13 24 16 17 11 4 1 
 
4.3.2.2 Increasing ratio of consumers to sites over time 
 
Here we examine the case in which sites and users enter the market with exponential growth rates but in such a 
way that the ratio of users to sites is increasing with time as shown in the following figure. 
Figure 22 
 
The number of sites that entered the market in this experiment is 100 and the number of consumers 17000. 
The following table contains aggregate statistics concerning the number of alive and dead sites and whether they 
are coalesced or not in the end of the simulation.  
 
 
In this case, only 10 sites (i.e. 10%) that entered the market do not manage to repay their initial dept and exit the 
market because the growing ratio of consumers to users creates favorable circumstances for the prosperity of the 
sites. Like before, most of alive sites belong to some coalition, 75 alive sites are coalesced in the end of the 
simulation while only 15 alive sites are not coalesced.  
 
The following figure shows the average profit of the coalesced sites, the average profit of the non-coalesced sites 
and the average profit over all sites in each simulation time step. 
 
Number of 
alive coalesced sites 
Number of 
alive non coalesced sites
Number of 
dead coalesced sites
Number of 
dead non coalesced sites 
75 (75%) 15 (15%) 5 (5%) 5 (5%) 
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Figure 23 
 
Like in the previous experiments, the average profit of coalesced sites is always higher than that of the non-
coalesced sites. The average profit over all sites and over the coalesced sites increases not only because of the 
death of existing sites but also because of the fact that the consumers to sites ratio also increases with time in this 
case. In the end of the simulation the average profit of the coalesced sites are almost 1,6 times the ones when the 
consumers to sites ratio remained constant over time, while the average profit of the non-coalesced sites is 2,1 
times higher.  
 
The two lines in the next figure represent the number of alive and dead sites in each step of the simulation. The 
thicker line represents the number of alive sites.  
Figure 24 
 
In this experiment, the number of sites that survive is constantly higher than the number of sites that exit the 
market and there is a big difference between them as already mentioned.  
 
In this experiment 16 coalitions are formed (which is the double than what was obtained with constant 
consumers-sites ratio) in the end of the simulation and their size varied from 2 to 7.  
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Coalition Size  
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of coalitions 3 2 2 2 4 3 
 
In the following figure we can see the coalitions that are formed in this experiment. 
 
  
  
  
Figure 25 
 
It is evident that there is a significant number of big size coalitions (size 5-7, which are, as we have seen before, 
the more profitable). 7 of these coalitions have a size greater than 6. 
 
5th outcome of the agent-based approach: An increasing ratio of consumers to sites encourages the 
emergence of dispersion in the market resulting to an oligopoly of big coalitions coexisting in the market. 
 
4.3.2.3 Decreasing ratio of consumers to sites over time 
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Finally we examine the case in which sites and users enter the market with exponential growth rates but in such a 
way that the ratio of users to sites is decreasing with time as shown in the following figure. 
Figure 26 
 
The number of sites that entered the market in this experiment is 517 and the number of consumers 2277. 
In this experiment only 16% of sites that entered the market survive and 71% of these sites are coalesced. 
  
Number of 
alive coalesced sites 
Number of 
alive non coalesced sites
Number of 
dead coalesced sites
Number of 
dead non coalesced sites 
59 (11.4%) 24 (4.6%) 243 (47%) 191 (37%) 
 
Figure 27 shows the average profit of the coalesced sites, the average profit of the non-coalesced sites and the 
average profit over all sites in each simulation time step.  
Figure 27 
 
The average profit of coalesced sites is still higher than the average profit of non-coalesced sites, although this 
time, their difference is less than before. The average profit of all alive sites decreases, contrary to the previous 
experiments, due to the fact that in this experiment the ratio of consumers to sites is decreasing. In the end of the 
simulation the average profit of coalesced sites is almost 4,2 times lower than the ones when the consumers to 
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sites ratio remains constant over time, while the average profit of the non-coalesced sites is 3 times lower. 
 
The two lines in the next figure represent the number of alive and dead sites in each step of the simulation. The 
thicker line represents the number of dead sites.  
Figure 28 
 
One can easily see that the number of sites that exit the market is much higher than in the previous experiments 
due to the decrease of consumers-sites ratio, which makes more difficult with time the survival of sites. 
 
The number of existing coalitions in each time step is shown in the following figure.  
Figure 29 
 
Contrary to all the previous experiments the number of coalitions constantly increases over time because many 
sites exit the market, consequently a lot of coalitions disappear before they have the chance to grow in size.  
 
For the first time in this experiment we observe the existence of aggregation in the emerging market structure: 
only 2 coalitions of size greater than 3 are formed, while there is a large number of small coalitions of size 2 and 
3.  
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Coalition Size  
2 3 5 7 
Number of coalitions 13 7 1 1 
 
  
  
Figure 30 
 
In this experiment, we see that only 2 big coalitions dominate the market. The structure is more concentrated 
since the duopoly faces the competition of many small-size coalitions and single sites, which are therefore less 
efficient.  
 
6th outcome of the agent-based approach: A decreasing ratio of consumers to sites encourages the 
emergence of concentration in the market resulting to a market structure that goes towards a monopoly. 
 
In a larger scale experiment where the number of sites that enter the market goes to 1000 and the number of 
consumers goes to 4240, we obtained the same phenomenon of concentration in the market. Only 2 coalitions of 
size larger than 4 are formed: 
Coalition Size  
2 3 4 6 7 
Number of coalitions 24 9 3 1 1 
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4.4 Decreasing search cost 
 
In the experiments presented in this section the search cost decreases linearly for all consumers with time as 
explained in Assumption 10. The search cost at time step 1 is 1.0 for all consumers in the market and at the end 
of the simulation it becomes 0.25.  
The reduction of search cost has two implications in the behavior of model. On one hand, the natural territories 
of sites, which are given by the formula tc/ , decrease with the search cost, meaning that with time sites 
become less connex among them (the intersection of their natural territories diminishes) and, as a result, it is 
more easy for a site to accept to coalesced with another site.  
 
The following table contains aggregate statistics concerning this experiment. The decrease in the search cost did 
not affect the final numbers of alive and dead sites (coalesced or not) in the market. 
 
Number of 
alive coalesced sites 
Number of 
alive non coalesced sites
Number of 
dead coalesced sites
Number of 
dead non coalesced sites 
35 (35%) 10 (10%) 36 (36%) 19 (19%) 
 
The same number of coalitions is formed as when the search cost is constant, but we do not observe the presence 
of a larger size coalition, like 7 or 8. On the contrary, we observe more medium-sized coalitions.  
 
Coalition Size  
2 3 4 6 
Number of coalitions 2 1 1 4 
 
Finally, the table below contains the results of an experiment where the search cost decreases just like described 
above, but when the ratio of users to consumers also decreases with time (this setting lead to a concentrated 
market structure as mentioned in the end of the previous section). We see that the market is less concentrated 
when the search cost decreases.  
 
This result is due to the decrease of the natural territories that decreases the competition among sites since it 
makes them less connex. This creates more opportunities for coalitions to be formed resulting in a market in 
which more coalitions manage to grow. 
 
 
 
Coalition Size   
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Decreasing search cost 16 20 13 18 11 2 
Number of coalitions 
Constant search cost 24 9 3 - 1 1 
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4.5 Price adjustment  
 
In this section we show the results of experiments in which the sites have the possibility to adjust their prices 
according to the two alternative algorithms described in Assumption 6. We are interested in seeing whether or 
not the concentration that emerges in the market under the conditions described in the 7th outcome of our model 
is affected.  
The new sequence of events when sites adjust their prices in the beginning of each time step is shown in the 
following figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 
 
The values of the more important simulations parameters in the following experiments are shown in the table 
below. The initial price of each site entering the market is randomly selected in [0.1, 20.0].  
 
Parameter Value 
Number of sites 517 
Number of users 2277 
Initial number of sites 20 
Initial number of users 1000 
Reservation Utility  10000 
Search Cost 1  
Reduced Search Cost 0 
Adaptation Cost 1000 
Consumers’ anticipated price p*= 10 
Consumers’ priors on locations uniform 
Price adjustment == maxmin pp δδ 1.0 
 
The experiments with the different price adjustment algorithms show that both kinds of price adjustment 
algorithms give better average profits for all sites, DFA being more efficient as we can see in the following 
figure: 
all consumers 
search & buy
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Coalitions  
formed 
- new sites & users enter 
Coalitions  
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Coalitions  
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- sites exit the market
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all consumers 
search & buy
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Figure 32 
 
However, we can see that the price adjustment is more beneficial for coalesced sites than for non-coalesced. 
Figure 44 shows the average profit with price adjustment is clearly separated from the average profit without 
price adjustment: 
Figure 33 
 
While for non-coalesced sites the price adjustment has little not a significant effect: 
Figure 34 
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7th outcome of the agent-based approach: During the dynamic process of coalition formation with price 
adjustment, the average profit of coalesced sites is better than the profit of non-coalesced sites, confirming the 
result of the static comparative model. 
 
Finally, in terms of the aggregation, as we can see in the following table, the DFA price adjustment algorithm 
diminishes less the concentrated character of the market compared to the RND price adjustment algorithm. 
 
4.6 Agent Heterogeneity 
 
All the runs described in the previous sections have been repeated with heterogeinity in the agents’ 
characteristics (the corresponding values were selected following a uniform distribution each time): search cost, 
reduced search cost, reservation utility, adaptation cost, prices (constant) and entry cost. 
However, the determining value for these runs appeared to be the average value of these parameters resulting in 
similar results than those obtain with symmetric agents. The relative “noise” brought by variations in these 
parameters do not change the qualitative results presented in the previous sections.  
5. General conclusion 
 
The analytical model showed that the presence of search costs for the consumers (to find a good in a 
differentiated market) that are independent from the adaptation costs they incur (when the good they find does 
not match with their preference) provides original and interesting results: (i) coalesced sites have an incentive to 
lower their prices and (ii) sites choose a highly differentiated partner to form a coalition. 
The agent-based model extends the analytical model with less restricting assumptions that help in the 
understanding of the dynamics of the formation of coalitions on the Web. The agent-based model was enriched 
by additional behaviors for the consumers and the sites, which make the representation of an electronic B-to-C 
market more realistic compared to the theoretical model.  
The basic findings of the agent-based model are the following: 
 
- The dynamic process coalition formation confirms and generalises the theoretical result in terms of coalition 
structure: non-connex partners are preferred when forming a coalition. 
- The growth of the coalition is halted before it reaches the size of the maximum possible non-connex coalition. 
- Although non-connex partners are always preferable for coalescing with, the dynamic process of multiple 
coalition formation allows the emergence of coalitions containing connex components as a reply to the 
competition from existing coalitions in the market. 
- The agents’ growth allows the coalitions to grow more through the reduction of the random effect (consumers’ 
Coalition Size  
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant prices 24 9 3 - 1 1 
RND price adj 8 5 3 2 - - Number of coalitions 
DFA 11 4 - 3 1 - 
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growth) and the possibility to accept connex components (sites’ growth). 
- An increasing ratio of consumers to sites encourages the emergence of dispersion in the market resulting to an 
oligopoly of big coalitions coexisting in the market. 
- A decreasing ratio of consumers to sites encourages the emergence of concentration in the market resulting to a 
market structure that goes towards a monopoly  
- During the dynamic process of coalition formation with price adjustment the average profits of coalesced sites 
is better than the profit of non-coalesced sites, confirming the result of the static comparative model. 
- The decrease in the consumers’ search cost with time causes a lowering in the market concentration. 
- Experiments performed on the role of heterogeinity proved to have little or no impact on qualitative results 
mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above summarises the different approaches used to study B-to-C coalitions and their outcomes. 
 
If we look at the geographical economy literature applied to the aggregation of shops in some locations, two 
main forces are present : the lowering of search costs for consumers that may ignore the prices and 
characteristics of goods but a priori know the number of products that are offered in a given location, on one 
side, and the increased competition due to the proximity of shops, on the other side. The first force drives 
aggregation by directly increasing the demand through the number of consumers that want to economize on 
search costs whose main component is transportation cost. The second one may limit this aggregation when price 
decrease due to competition is no more counterbalanced by the increased market accruing to each shop, except 
when price coordination is made possible, for instance through mergers. In the world of B-to-C merchant 
internet sites, these mechanisms are severely modified because search cost are not transportation costs and 
because aggregation may arise through coalition of independent sites at (almost) no cost, what ever the type of 
goods offered by each firm (or the location of shops in a differentiated space along consumers preferences). 
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Mono-product firms have to coalesce in order to gain market share on non coalesced firms through a demand 
effect (number of visitors) even when consumers have no priors about the existence of such coalitions (they 
ignore that they are entering a city), firms prefer to coalesce with different firms, not for avoiding stronger 
competition but for maximizing the increased market share effect in the competition with non coalesced firms. 
The multi-agent simulation confirms the qualitative results of the analytical model (preference for coalitions and 
coalitions of non connex sites) and give some insights on the dynamic process that may lead to more or less 
concentrated market structure on the (merchant side) of the Web, without taking into account merges that may 
arise for anticompetitive reasons nor network effects on the consumers side : the larger number of entry of new 
Web merchant sites compared to the growth of consumers buying on the Web seems to be the main factor 
explaining the concentration (few number of very big coalitions). Within this framework, the venture capitalism 
bubble for Web sites that excessively favoured the entry of new sites before the market was there would have 
dramatically favoured this form of concentration. 
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